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Nationalist Circles in Japan Today: 
The Impossibility of Secularization
Thierry Guthmann
Contrary to what sometimes has been suggested, contemporary Japanese 
society is no exception to the rule that the more a society modernizes, the 
more its individuals become secular. Simultaneously, however, since the 
end of the 1990s the political sphere in Japan has seen a return of religious 
elements. This phenomenon is particularly noticeable in the case of 
nationalist circles. State Shinto, which was imposed in the prewar period by 
the authorities of imperial Japan, constitutes the ideological foundation for 
these circles. More specifically, the emperor cult and the cult of the war dead 
at Yasukuni Shrine are the two main components of this ideology. This article 
argues that is unlikely that the ideology and activities of nationalist circles in 
Japan will acquire a more secular character, given the fundamentally religious 
character of their vision of the national community. Nippon Kaigi, a large 
confederation of political and religious movements, occupies a central place 
in this nationalist revival. Many politicians of the first rank are involved with 
this organization. As this article demonstrates, the ideological positions of its 
members are placed on a continuum, ranging from a religious nationalism 
close to historical State Shinto to more moderate statements suggesting 
the existence of a type of Japanese civil religion. Ultimately, members and 
sympathizers of nationalist movements in Japan are all motivated, to varying 
degrees, by nostalgia for a golden age of the nation.
Keywords: religion, politics, Nippon Kaigi, State Shinto, the emperor, 
Yasukuni Shrine, Jinja Honchō, Abe Shinzō, civil religion, golden age
Introduction
As Ian Reader has demonstrated in a recent article, Japanese society is becoming 
increasingly secular.1 In opposition to a number of academics who have used Japan as 
a counter-example against the secularization thesis, Reader provides powerful evidence 
showing that urbanization and education have contributed to the withdrawal of religion 
from the daily lives of Japanese people. Individual religious practices are losing importance 




in an article published in the same issue of the Journal of Religion in Japan, Mark Mullins 
convincingly argues that the secularization of Japanese society has multiple dimensions.2 
Although secularization is at an advanced stage when it comes to individual religious 
practice, this is not the case when it comes to political life. Paradoxically, the decrease in 
individual religious practice has been accompanied, in the second half of the 1990s, by 
a renewed importance of the religious dimensions of political activities, not in the least 
when it comes to conservative circles. This development probably corresponds to what 
José Casanova meant when he used the term “deprivatization of religion” to describe, in 
four different countries, the reemergence in the public sphere of religious actors who had 
previously withdrawn to the private sphere.3 Similarly, in today’s Japan, nationalist circles—
backed by the Shinto shrine world—are the increasingly influential advocates of a view of 
the nation that is fundamentally religious.4
Throughout this article, I use the term “nationalist circles” to refer to a group of 
political organizations representing ideological positions that are very similar. Of these, 
Nippon Kaigi 日本会議 (Japan Conference) and Jinja Honchō 神社本庁 (Association of 
Shinto Shrines) are the two most important organizations. The online TV channel Nihon 
Bunka Channeru Sakura 日本文化チャンネル桜 (Japanese Culture Channel Sakura) and 
the activist group Ganbare Nippon! Zenkoku Kōdō Iinkai 頑張れ日本！	全国行動委員会 
(Ganbare Nippon! National Action Committee) are also major actors within this movement. 
Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukuru Kai 新しい歴史教科書をつくる会 (Japan Society for 
History Textbook Reform) is another well-known organization that is part of the “nationalist 
circles” discussed in this article.5
It should be pointed out here that the ideological platform of Japanese nationalist 
circles is not limited to the religious dimension. In fact, members are primarily concerned 
with strengthening the nation; that is, reestablishing Japan as a strong country politically. 
Thus, they strive for a revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, so that Japan can have an 
official army, and no longer renounce the sovereign right of belligerency. Another of their 
key priorities is the popularization of a more positive account of the actions of the imperial 
army during the Pacific War, especially in school textbooks. In fact, in Japanese nationalist 
circles, the contents of history education since the end of the war are typically described 
as “masochistic” ( jigyakuteki 自虐的); according to this view, such history education is the 
cause of the lack of pride and patriotism in Japan today. Another major political battle for 
them concerns the defense of territorial integrity, especially against Chinese and Korean 
claims.6
Thus, the majority of the political battles waged by nationalist circles in Japan do not 
have religious dimensions. Yet the fact remains that within these circles, popular devotion 
for the emperor and the existence of a national cult of the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine are 
2 Mullins 2012a.
3 Casanova 1994. 
4 I use the term “nationalism” to refer to an ideology made up of claims that the strength of a national 
community should be preserved at all costs, since individuals are not able to fully exist outside of this 
community.
5 Due to internal conflicts and schisms in the first decade of the twenty-first century, this group lost much of its 
former influence to a new organization with similar objectives, the Kyōkasho Kaizen no Kai 教科書改善の会 
(Society for Improvement of Textbooks).
6 On these political activities of the nationalist circles in Japan, see Guthmann 2017.
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considered as two fundamental, indispensable elements of a Japan that has regained all its 
state power. The cult of the emperor and the cult of the war dead are two remnants of State 
Shinto, which, I argue in this article, have a religious character. It should nevertheless be 
noted that the majority of ideologues involved with nationalist movements in Japan consider 
Shinto to belong to the realm of customs, not that of religion, as was indeed the case in 
prewar Japan. This point of view is still strong today, as the following example illustrates. 
I recently interviewed Ms. F., a resident of Mie Prefecture who has been active for 
many years as the leader of a local branch of Nippon Kaigi.7 According to her, Shinto was 
placed into the category “religion” by the American occupying forces: “Originally, Shinto 
shrines were not religious places,” she stated. “However, during the occupation, Shinto was 
put in the same legal category as other religions.” 8 Ms. F. then declared that she does not 
consider Shinto to be a religion. This was all the more interesting, since prior to coming 
to the teahouse where we had our interview, she had entered a shrine to conduct an act of 
worship. Ms. F. argued: “As a matter of fact, in Shinto there is no founder, there are no 
commandments, and no proselytization. Shinto consists of customs that are an integral part 
of Japanese everyday life. This has nothing in common with other religious movements.” 
When asked to define religion, she replied: “It is necessary to have a founder, followers, 
the will to disseminate a teaching, sacred books. Shinto has none of those things. The 
only things there are, are religious festivals (matsuri 祭).” I pointed out that when there is 
a collective belief in the existence of deities, we can speak of religion. Ms. F. retorted: “But 
Japanese deities are not comparable to those that can be found in Christianity, for example. 
In Japan, the living and their deities are connected by family ties. They are ancestors. 
Japanese deities are not absolute, all-knowing and omnipotent, like the Christian God. 
People in the Meiji period translated the word ‘God’ as kami 神, which is why things have 
become so complicated.”
Ms. F. adheres to a very widespread conception of religion, which has roots in the 
Meiji period. Jason Josephson has demonstrated that, during this period, the concept of 
religion was invented under pressure from Western nations following the introduction of 
Christianity. He explains that Meiji-period leaders were the supervisors of a large project to 
classify various existing beliefs and worship traditions: “Put briefly, Confucianism was not 
recognized as a religion, but was instead treated as a scholastic subject. Shinto was bifurcated 
into a national form of Shinto, which was not defined as religion, and various individual 
Shinto sects, which were. In the end, only Buddhism was legally described as a religion.” 9 
This conception of Shinto as a non-religion was reversed after the war by the American 
occupying forces, who reclassified Shinto as a religion in law. Nevertheless, like the majority 
of ideologues involved with nationalist circles in Japan, Ms. F. does not subscribe to the 
understanding of Shinto as a religion. Instead, she remains committed to a vision of Shinto 
as “national custom.”
It is interesting to note that the interpretation of religious practices as “customs” is 
not unique to Japanese society. The French scholar Jean Baubérot recently published his 
typology of different expressions of the laïcité phenomenon, which includes “identity laïcité” 
7 Interview conducted on 26 May 2015.
8 Ironically, this is what saved Yasukuni Shrine from destruction. On this topic, see Mullins 2010.
9 Josephson 2011, p. 594, my emphasis. In addition to Buddhism, Christianity was also recognized as a religion.
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(la laïcité identitaire).10 This notion strongly resembles the view of Japanese nationalists, as 
it refers to an ideology which considers Catholicism in France as a “cultural” phenomenon, 
not a religious one. This is the understanding of laïcité advocated by former president 
Nicolas Sarkozy, in particular when he talked about the “Christian roots” of France.
My approach to secularization is strongly influenced by the concept of laïcité. Louis-
Marie Morfaux has given the following definition: “Independence of the state and public 
services, especially public education, from any church or religious creed; synonymous 
with neutrality.” 11 In an earlier book devoted to the topic of different types of laïcité and 
secularism throughout the world, Baubérot provides a universal description of this concept: 
“A process of secularization (laïcisation) occurs when a state no longer is legitimated by a 
religion or a particular school of thought.” 12 Now, for Japanese nationalists, as we shall 
see throughout this article, Japan cannot do without the emperor cult and its ideological 
template, State Shinto. Thus, my approach to secularization is limited to the political 
dimensions of this phenomenon and does not encompass its sociological dimensions (which 
are taken up by Ian Reader, for example, in the article referred to above). 
This article consists of two parts. Following authors such as Shimazono Susumu, 
Mark Mullins, and John Breen, the first part shows that contemporary Japanese nationalist 
movements are primarily nourished by the ideology provided by State Shinto.13 In the 
second part, I will argue that the fundamentally religious character of this vision of the 
national community prevents any secularization of the activities and ideology of Japanese 
nationalist circles. 
1.  State Shinto:  
The Major Ideological Source of Contemporary Nationalist Movements
In this article, I do not engage with debates concerning the origins and importance of State 
Shinto prior to 1945. Instead, my focus is on the contemporary period, in which elements of 
prewar State Shinto linger on. In my use of the term “State Shinto,” I follow the definition 
given by Shimazono Susumu in his article in The Sage Handbook of the Sociology of Religion: 
“When I use this term [State Shinto] I refer to Shinto-inspired ideas and practices that are 
mainly propagated by agencies of the Japanese state or government in connection with 
attempts to integrate the nation and to strengthen the sense of national loyalty—and which 
are accepted by many of the Japanese people.” 14 In a book on existing relations between 
State Shinto and the Japanese people, Shimazono specifies that this national loyalty is 
constructed primarily around the emperor. In addition, as explained in the following 
section, Yasukuni Shrine is considered by many in nationalist circles as a sacred center 
unifying the Japanese nation. As Shimazono writes: “In reality, State Shinto was never 
dismantled. Surely, it was considerably reduced in size. Nevertheless, it still exists today.” 15
10 Baubérot 2015, p. 118. Translator’s note: the term laïcité is used to refer to the particular type of secularism 
that has developed in France, which is characterized by a strict separation of public and private realms, the 
first of which is configured as explicitly nonreligious. Since the term is so distinctive, I have chosen not to 
translate it, but use it as a foreign loanword [APR].
11 Morfaux 1980, p. 190.
12 Baubérot 2007, p. 3.
13 Shimazono 2010; Mullins 2012a, 2012b; Breen 2010.
14 Shimazono 2007, p. 700.
15 Shimazono 2010, p. 185.
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(i) The Emperor Cult and the Cult of the War Dead: The Survival of State Shinto
Why is it possible to say that State Shinto continues to exist? First of all, it should be 
noted that despite his official renunciation of divine status, the emperor still constitutes a 
fundamentally religious entity. An analysis of the ideology of Jinja Honchō will illustrate 
this observation.
Jinja Honchō owes its existence to the 1945 Shinto Directive issued by the American 
occupying forces, which relegated the management of Shinto places of worship to the 
private realm. Nevertheless, Jinja Honchō is the direct descendant of organizations within 
the imperial government that had formerly been concerned with the management of 
Shinto worship, such as the Jingiin 神祇院, the Hōsaikai 奉斎会, and the national priests 
association. Jinja Honchō represents approximately eighty thousand shrines—that is, 
the vast majority of Shinto places of worship in the country. In May 2000 former Prime 
Minister Mori Yoshirō made a famous declaration that Japan is the country of the gods with 
the emperor as its center in front of a group of members of parliament involved with the 
political arm of Jinja Honchō: the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership (Shinto Seiji 
Renmei 神道政治連盟).
At the center of the cult advocated by Jinja Honchō is Ise Shrine, often simply referred 
to as “the shrine” ( jingū 神宮). The deity venerated at this site, located in the city of Ise, is 
Amaterasu Ōmikami 天照大御神, the sun goddess situated on top of the Shinto pantheon. 
For Jinja Honchō, the worship of this goddess ultimately constitutes an attitude of indirect 
devotion to the emperor, her descendant. Thus, on the website of this organization, we 
can read the following in an article on Ise shrine: “At its center is the Great Imperial 
Shrine (Naikū 内宮), where Amaterasu Ōmikami, the ancestress of the imperial family, is 
worshipped.” 16 This is presented as an objective fact: the current emperor is the 125th of a 
long lineage that started on 11 February 660 BC with Emperor Jinmu 神武, descendant of 
the sun goddess.
It may be worth noting that Japan is the only industrialized country, as far as I am 
aware, where the date of National Foundation Day, 11 February, is based on a mythical-
religious event. In fact, the reign of the first historical emperor (whose existence is proven 
by historical documents) is generally considered to have been around the sixth century 
AD, more than a millennium after the official establishment of the nation. This vagueness 
regarding the historical or mythological nature of the first emperors contributes to 
maintaining the divine aura of the imperial family.
Likewise, the emperor regularly conducts ceremonies of a Shinto nature, in accordance 
with the rhythm of the seasons. Many of these are propitiatory rituals, conducted for the 
benefit of the nation. Actually, there is genuine continuity between prewar and postwar 
imperial rites since the American Occupation left them untouched. Officially, these 
ceremonies have a private character. Nevertheless, the prime minister, other ministers, 
members of parliament, judges, and officials of the Imperial Household Agency are invited 
to take part in a number of them. Shimazono has commented upon this situation as 
follows: “It is clear that ceremonies with a Shinto nature are conducted as state ceremonies. 
Nevertheless, they are treated as ‘internal affairs of the imperial court’: as the private acts of 
16 On http://www.jinjahoncho.or.jp/izanai/ise/ (accessed 29 January 2016). 
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the Imperial House. For that reason, citizens are not informed about them.” 17 It should be 
noted that, while the average Japanese indeed has no awareness of this religious dimension 
of the activities of their monarch, this is not the case for most members of the nationalist 
circles outlined above.
Shimazono traces the relations between State Shinto and the Japanese, and reaches the 
conclusion that after the war State Shinto has survived in three forms: first, in the shape of 
the everyday rituals of the imperial family; second, in the activism of private organizations 
such as Jinja Honchō; and finally, in the shape of popular devotion centered on the emperor 
and thoughts about/sentiments for the national body (kokutaironteki na kangaekata/shinjō 
国体論的な考え方・心情).18 Yet, in his book Shimazono does not mention that State Shinto 
today also survives in a fourth shape, which arguably is at least as important as the other 
three: the rituals and other ceremonies conducted annually at Yasukuni Shrine.19 This 
shrine constituted the keystone of prewar State Shinto, since soldiers of the imperial army 
who had died for the nation were honored there by the emperor, the sacred embodiment of 
the nation.
In a recent article devoted to the history of Yasukuni Shrine as a “shrine of the nation,” 
John Breen demonstrates that this site of commemoration did not acquire a truly national 
character until the celebrations in the spring of 1938.20 This was the first time that a large 
number of people participated in its ceremonies. Furthermore, Breen suggests that after 
the Japanese defeat, Yasukuni Shrine lost its status as “shrine of the nation,” and specifies 
that it has not recovered this since. He justifies this statement by pointing to the separation 
between the nation—that is, the Japanese people—and the celebrations with a nationalist 
character held at the shrine. According to Breen, even though large numbers of people still 
visit Yasukuni Shrine, many of them do so not in order to commemorate those who died for 
the nation but in order to participate in the festivities of July (mitama matsuri みたままつり) 
or the New Year. He thus arrives at the following conclusion: “One could perhaps sum up 
postwar Yasukuni by saying that while ‘nationalism’ is alive and kicking there today, the 
nation is conspicuous by its absence. The organic linkage between the shrine, its rites and 
nationalism on the one hand, and the Japanese nation on the other, is no more.” 21 This 
analysis of national dimensions of the shrine after the war—or rather, for this period, the 
absence of a national dimension—certainly corresponds to the reality. However, as will be 
made clear in the second part of this article, it is precisely this national dimension of the 
shrine that nationalist circles are trying hard to restore.
The two main festivals of Yasukuni Shrine, now a private religious organization, 
take place in spring and autumn. In both cases, the emperor sends gifts and an official 
message. Although the festivities last three or four days in total, the arrival by car of the 
imperial messenger in the heart of the shrine, the transportation of the gifts and message 
on a palanquin by shrine priests, and their presentation to the deities constitute the height 
of the celebrations. Likewise, each year on 15 August, the anniversary of Japan’s defeat, a 
17 Shimazono 2010, p. 191.
18 Shimazono 2010, pp. 212–13.
19 It should however be mentioned that in a subsequent article Shimazono writes at length about the Yasukuni 
Shrine issue and its connection to State Shinto. See Shimazono 2016.
20 Breen 2014.
21 Breen 2014, p. 147.
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significant number of members of 
parliament come to Yasukuni in 
order to participate in the religious 
ceremony conducted daily in memory 
of those who died for the country. 
They are members of a group called 
the Association of Diet Members 
for Worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine 
Together (Minna de Yasukuni Jinja 
ni Sanpai Suru Kokkai Giin no Kai 
みんなで靖國神社に参拝する国会
議	員の会). Finally, the famous visits 
of the prime minister in office—if 
they take place—always provoke a 
storm of criticism and indignation, 
internationally as well as domestically. 
Today Yasukuni Shrine continues 
to be a site of convergence between 
religion, the emperor, politicians, 
and the nation through the worship 
of those who sacrificed their lives in 
war. This combination constituted 
the fundamental characteristic of 
State Shinto.
For all the reasons listed above, 
I fully agree with the following 
statement by Shimazono Susumu: 
“After 1945, State Shinto has continued 
to exist.… Since the war, the private 
organization of shrines and priests 
(Jinja Honchō) has been one of the 
leaders of the movement for State 
Shinto.” 22 Although Shimazono mainly addresses the activities and ideology of Jinja 
Honchō, in this article I am also particularly interested in the ideology of Nippon Kaigi, the 
biggest nationalist pressure group in contemporary Japan. Significantly, this organization 
unites a large number of political-religious movements around Jinja Honchō, all of which 
are motivated, to varying degrees, by a desire to revitalize State Shinto.
(ii) Nippon Kaigi: Ideological Heirs of State Shinto
During the first decades of the postwar period, nationalist groups in Japan lost much 
of their previous inf luence as a result of the defeat and the accompanying political-
administrative reorganization. Since then, they have worked persistently to regain some 
of the lost ground. This process of recovery accelerated in the late 1990s, and is currently 
22 Shimazono 2010, p. v.
Figure 1. Reception desk of the Association of Diet Members 
for Worshipping at Yasukuni Shrine Together. Autumn Festival, 
Yasukuni Shrine, 2014. Photo by the author.
Figure 2. Transportation of the gifts and message of the emperor 




materialized by the establishment of the second government of Abe Shinzō 安倍晋三. As 
suggested by Mark Mullins, the great earthquake in Kobe and the sarin gas attack on the 
subway in Tokyo in 1995 caused severe emotional and psychological shocks that might have 
constituted the catalysts for a return of right-wing nationalism. That is, these events caused 
chaos in society, demanding, one way or the other, that the order of things be restored. The 
nationalist right has certainly profited from these crises provoked by a profound challenge 
to the values on which postwar Japan was built.23 
The regaining of political influence by the nationalist right can be illustrated by the 
fact that in February 2015, fifteen out of nineteen members of the Abe government were 
members of the parliamentary association of Nippon Kaigi; meanwhile, eighteen of them 
were (also) members of the parliamentary association of the Shinto Association of Spiritual 
Leadership.24 Of these fifteen ministers, at least five have maintained strong ties with 
nationalist lobby groups since the start of their political careers—not least Prime Minister 
Abe himself. Arimura Haruko 有村治子, the minister in charge of women’s empowerment 
and measures against the declining birthrate, and Yamatani Eriko 山谷えり子, minister in 
charge of public safety and the abduction issue, are primarily dependent upon the support 
of Nippon Kaigi for their election and reelection. The same applies to one of the special 
advisors to the prime minister (Naikaku sōri daijin hosakan 内閣総理大臣補佐官), Senator 
Etō Seiichi 衛藤晟一.
Abe Shinzō himself has maintained close links with Nippon Kaigi for a long time. 
For instance, in December 2009, he actively participated in a large rally organized by 
the nationalist lobby in order to protest the “political use” made of the emperor by the 
Democratic Party of Japan government.25 On 1 April 2014, after he had become prime 
minister again, Abe was special advisor (tokubetsu komon 特別顧問) of the parliamentary 
association of Nippon Kaigi.26 A number of newspaper and magazine articles have strongly 
denounced the ties that unite the new Abe government with this nationalist organization, 
sometimes even referring to it as the “Nippon Kaigi cabinet” (Nippon Kaigi naikaku 日本
会議内閣).27 According to the count done by Tawara Yoshifumi, as of 23 April 2016, 
280 members of the Japanese Diet, representing different political parties, took part 
in the parliamentary association of Nippon Kaigi. A significant majority of these were 
also affiliated with the parliamentary association of the Shinto Association of Spiritual 
Leadership, Jinja Honchō’s political arm.28
But what exactly is Nippon Kaigi? In terms of the number of individual activists 
involved as well as the various groups and movements affiliated with it, Nippon Kaigi 
23 Mullins 2012b.
24 Tawara 2015, p. 155.
25 Nippon no ibuki 日本の息吹, March 2010, p. 20. This is a monthly magazine sent to members of Nippon 
Kaigi. It contains articles written by a diversity of authors (politicians, academics, activists, and so on), as well 
as detailed accounts of the activities of Nippon Kaigi. The magazine often addresses current affairs, while 
ensuring that the views presented are in accordance with the position of the nationalist lobby.
26 This is according to Nippon Kaigi’s internal document Heisei 26 nendo kokumin undō hōshin  / Heisei 25 
nendo katsudō hōkoku, p. 15 (not published).
27 See for instance the article published in the weekly magazine Friday in August 2014 (Furaidē, 22–29 August, 
pp. 18–21). Similarly, the daily newspaper Asahi shinbun published a series of articles on the topic, entitled 
“Nippon kaigi kenkyū” (Research on Nippon Kaigi), on 23, 24, and 25 March 2016.
28 Shūkan kinyōbi 2016.
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constitutes the largest confederation of nationalist organizations in contemporary Japan.29 It 
was established in 1997 as a merger between two older nationalist organizations. The first, 
Nihon o Mamoru Kai 日本を守る会, consisted of a number of new religious movements, as 
well as Jinja Honchō; the second, Nihon o Mamoru Kokumin Kaigi 日本を守る国民会議, 
brought together associations of war veterans as well as a number of other groups advocating 
nationalist ideas. The Advisory Committee of Japanese Youth (Nihon Seinen Kyōgi Kai 
日本青年協議会) took care of the administrative management of these two organizations, 
and continues to do so for Nippon Kaigi.30 Currently, Jinja Honchō is considered to be the 
backbone of Nippon Kaigi. 
When I met representatives of Nippon Kaigi, I asked them whether it is true that Jinja 
Honchō makes up the core of Nippon Kaigi, as I had been told at a reception following 
the organization’s general meeting in 2014. One of the representatives answered as follows: 
“As you can see here [showing a text listing Nippon Kaigi’s main values], the importance 
we place on traditional culture inevitably brings us to Shinto and the imperial family. 
Therefore, it is true that Jinja Honchō has a special place within Nippon Kaigi.” Previously, 
another representative had told me the following: “As you can see, in the main executive 
bodies of Nippon Kaigi are several representatives of Jinja Honchō. This shows that Jinja 
Honchō is an essential constitutive organization for Nippon Kaigi.” 31 Among the five 
advisors (komon 顧問) that make up the management board of Nippon Kaigi, there is one 
leader of Jinja Honchō and another of Shintō Seiji Renmei. Moreover, one of the four vice 
presidents, Tanaka Tsunekiyo 田中恆清, is simultaneously president (sōchō 総長) of Jinja 
Honchō.32 
Ideologically speaking, Jinja Honchō and Nippon Kaigi are extremely close. In a 
recent book devoted to the topic of the relationship between religion and politics in postwar 
Japan, Tsukada Hotaka confesses to being unable to find real differences between the two 
organizations’ ideologies.33 He argues persuasively that these two organizations, as well as 
the earlier organizations that merged and became Nippon Kaigi in 1997, have been at the 
center of a “unified conservative movement” (hoshu gōdō undō 保守合同運動) since the end 
of the war. In this movement, and on the board of Nippon Kaigi, there are also about ten 
representatives of new religious movements.34 Although one would expect these religious 
29 In July 2014, Nippon Kaigi had approximately 35,000 individual members. Membership is voluntary and 
open to all, regardless of nationality or political or religious affiliation. 
30 Uesugi 2016, pp. 27–34; Uozumi 2007, p. 187. The Advisory Committee of Japanese Youth traces its origins 
to a student movement set up in the late 1960s by the new religious movement Seichō no Ie, in reaction at the 
time to the strong pressure of leftist student movements. See http://www.seikyou.org/nihonkyogikai.html 
(accessed 23 June 2016).
31 Interview conducted on 18 July 2014 at the office of Nippon Kaigi in Tokyo.
32 See the official website of Nippon Kaigi: http://www.nipponkaigi.org/about/yakuin (accessed 25 June 2016). 
For an analysis of the views of Tanaka Tsunekiyo on Shinto’s “public” character, see the article by Rots in this 
issue.
33 Tsukada 2015, p. 65.
34 New religious movements represented on the board of Nippon Kaigi include Reiyūkai 霊友会, Shinsei Bukkyō 
新生佛教, Nenpō Shinkyō 念法眞教, Sūkyō Mahikari 崇教真光, Kurozumikyō 黒住教, Busshogonenkai 
佛所護念会, Taiwa Kyōdan 大和教団, and Gedatsukai 解脱会. Interestingly, several of these define themselves 
as Buddhist. For a more detailed analysis of the motivations of these religious groups, see Guthmann 2015.
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movements to be rivals, in the nationalist lobby they act together.35 The representatives 
of these organizations are all concerned with rebuilding a Japan centered on the imperial 
house, which they consider as the essential constitutive element of the nation.
It is interesting to note that the cult of the Japanese nation and the imperial family 
is not limited to Shinto-derived new religions, but also extends to Buddhist and even 
Christian groups. For instance, Buddhist monks close to Nippon Kaigi believe they have 
taken on, in the last forty years, the mission entrusted to them by the goddess Amaterasu: 
that is, to protect Japan from decline.36 The indigenous Christian organization Kirisuto no 
Makuya キリストの幕屋, founded by Teshima Ikurō 手島郁郎 in 1948, likewise has regular 
contact with Nippon Kaigi.37 This new religious movement with notable nationalistic 
tendencies encourages in particular the celebration of National Foundation Day and the cult 
of the first emperor, Jinmu, with the purpose of restoring a feeling of national pride among 
the Japanese.38
In this great ecumenical gathering of groups with diverse religious faiths, we find the 
manifestation of a Japanese form of civil religion, that is, a celebration of the Japanese nation 
that depends above all on devotion to the imperial family. Some government policies have 
undoubtedly contributed to the revival of this devotion, such as the restoration in 1966 of 
11 February as an official holiday commemorating the founding of the nation. Nevertheless, 
Nippon Kaigi is an organization characterized by strong grassroots mobilization, especially 
through the different religious groups that are united in it. Therefore, while historical 
State Shinto used to be imposed from above by those in power, civil religion today—the 
interiorized version of State Shinto—emanates to a large extent from below and is directed 
towards the top, that is, the imperial family. Analyzing this phenomenon in Durkheimian 
terms, it may be seen as a popular celebration of the national body.
2. Impossible Secularization: The Religious Character of Japan’s Nationalist Circles
As we have seen in the first part of this article, ideologically speaking, contemporary 
Japanese nationalism rests on State Shinto. It is not likely, therefore, that this nationalism, 
based on the cult of the emperor and of the spirits of the war dead enshrined at Yasukuni, 
will become more secular. However, the religious dimension of nationalist statements 
may be more or less pronounced, depending on the group and the individual. Viewpoints 
range from a religious nationalism close to that which prevailed prewar, to more moderate 
nationalist manifestations of a Japanese civil religion. The ideas of members and 
sympathizers of Nippon Kaigi can be classified into two large groups: those which resemble 
35 It appears that Nippon Kaigi regularly relies on religious movements for mobilizing participants at large 
mass rallies. For instance, as pointed out by Sugano Tamotsu, during the recent rally for constitutional 
reform organized on 10 November 2015 at Nihon Budōkan, Sūkyō Mahikari mobilized three thousand of its 
followers (Sugano 2016, p. 125).
36 Nippon no ibuki, December 2013, pp. 24–25. These monks are affiliated with an organization named Kansai 
Bukkyō Konwakai 関西仏教懇話会 (Kansai Buddhist Assembly).
37 Declining my request for an interview, a representative of this religious organization specified in a letter that 
Kirisuto no Makuya is not an official member of Nippon Kaigi. In fact, no representative of this movement is 
directly involved with the administration of the nationalist organization. Nevertheless, the same letter stated 
that for ideological reasons Kirisuto no Makuya has respect for the work of Nippon Kaigi, so it happens that 
some of its faithful participate in events and campaigns organized by Nippon Kaigi in an individual capacity.
38 Mullins 1998, p. 127.
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the ideology of historical State Shinto, and those which, though influenced by this ideology, 
belong more to the realm of civil religion. 
(i) Religious Nationalism: The Contemporary Shapes of State Shinto
In a recent edition of the monthly magazine Nippon no ibuki, published by Nippon Kaigi, 
the secretary-general of a local branch explains that the imperial palace is the most precious 
place in Japan, and that the voluntary cleaning of the palace precinct constitutes the first 
step towards the reconstruction of the country.39 In fact, most nationalist organizations 
regularly meet at the gardens of the imperial palace for cleaning and tidying up (kōkyo kinrō 
hōshi 皇居勤労奉仕). Today as in the past, devotion towards the imperial family remains an 
essential element of the activities of nationalist organizations: people offer their time (and 
money) for the well-being of the imperial family. 
Some, such as a representative of the new religion Taiwa Kyōdan, describe the 
centuries-old imperial lineage as follows: “It is the most important aspect, the central 
element of our national character (kunigara no chūshin 国柄の中心). This is an ancient male 
lineage, going back 125 generations, the history of which is intertwined with the history 
of Japan. Nothing surpasses this institution; nothing could ever replace it.” 40 The ideas 
of Nakanishi Terumasa, former professor at Kyoto University, are of a similar order. He 
claims that China was very close to installing a communist regime in Japan at the time of 
the negotiations for the Japan-US security treaty in 1960. He refers to a secret document, 
composed by the Chinese secret service, which analyses the necessary conditions for the 
success of a socialist revolution in Japan. This document supposedly explains that as long as 
the Japanese retain their ties to the Imperial House and to Shinto shrines, the revolutionary 
project will not succeed, as it is there they will continue to find the strength to resist. 
Nakanishi concludes by calling for a general realization that “protecting Japan, ultimately, 
means protecting the shape of the country symbolized by the Imperial House and by Shinto 
shrines. It should be understood that, if those are no longer protected, that would mean the 
end of Japan.” 41
I asked Professor Nitta Hitoshi, a scholar at Kogakkan University who regularly 
collaborates with Nippon Kaigi, why there are so many new religious movements active in 
the nationalist lobby. He replied as follows: “I believe that the person of the emperor is an 
important factor. New religions that do not include the emperor in their teachings do not 
join Nippon Kaigi. The fundamental nature of the person of the emperor is religious, is it 
not?” 42
It is clear that protecting the imperial family from any slight is a first priority. For 
instance, in 2007, there were plans to publish the Japanese translation of a book on Princess 
Masako, Princess Masako: Prisoner of the Chrysanthemum Throne, written by an Australian 
journalist.43 Japanese nationalist organizations used their influence to prevent publication. 
This book alleges that Princess Masako, wife of the crown prince, was bullied and harassed 
by the Imperial Household Agency (Kunaichō 宮内庁). Nationalist circles—most notably 
39 Nippon no ibuki, December 2010, p. 27. 
40 Interview conducted on 20 December 2013.
41 Nippon no ibuki, January 2013, p. 12.




Nippon Kaigi, but also the Japanese 
government led by Abe Shinzō—
perceived this book, which is highly 
critical of palace morals, as an insult 
to the imperial institution. An article 
by literary critic Takemoto Tadao, 
published in Nippon no ibuki, begins 
as follows: “When I read Grand 
Chamberlain Watanabe’s protest letter 
to the Australian writer of a book on 
Princess Masako which slanders the 
Imperial House, I could not resist my 
desire to take up the pen.” 44 Criticism 
of the imperial institution can lead to 
severe punishment, sometimes even 
to physical violence by nationalist 
extremists; as a result, such criticism is 
almost absent from the public debate.45
The nationalist circles in general, and Nippon Kaigi in particular, are also against 
the reform of the Imperial Household Law that would make matrilineal succession of 
the imperial throne possible. These nationalist organizations are not opposed to the 
enthronement of an empress per se, but to this empress giving birth to her successor. The 
logic at work here is that if this empress married a commoner and gave birth, the imperial 
lineage would be polluted; only the imperial male seed is considered sacred. Thus, even if 
this is not made explicit, the fierce opposition of the nationalist circles to matrilineality is 
grounded in the idea that the imperial lineage is of divine origin. 
Nippon Kaigi holds a fundamentally religious conception of Yasukuni Shrine. The 
remarks of the former president of Nippon Kaigi, Miyoshi Tōru 三好達 (former president 
of the Japanese Supreme Court), illustrate this well. Referring to a report on the possibility 
of constructing a site of commemoration for the war dead from which all religiosity would 
be excluded, he commented ironically: “Exclusion means ‘expulsion.’ Since only religion 
can give meaning to notions such as venerated spirits or souls, [the exclusion of religiosity] 
would mean the expulsion of the venerated spirits.” 46 Likewise, the comments of a 
municipal councilor of the city of Tsu, a member of Nippon Kaigi, reveal a similar religious 
sentiment. When I interviewed him, I remarked: “Since official commemoration ceremonies 
are conducted in the presence of the emperor at Nihon Budōkan, it may be argued that it 
is not necessary to hold them at Yasukuni as well.” The municipal councilor commented: 
44 Nippon no ibuki, April 2007, p. 18.
45 The Shimanaka affair in 1961 constitutes the best-known case of physical violence committed by a right-
wing extremist in response to a perceived insult of the imperial house. The perpetrator attacked the private 
residence of the director of a publishing company, killing his maid and severely injuring his wife. He wanted 
to punish those responsible for the publication of a short story entitled Fūryū mutan 風流夢譚 (The Story of a 
Dream of Courtly Elegance) by Fukazawa Shichirō 深沢七郎, which he considered blasphemous towards the 
emperor.
46 Nippon no ibuki, June 2015, p. 21.
Figure 3. Nationalist posters at a Shinto shrine in Matsue, 
Shimane Prefecture. The poster on the lef t states how 
fortunate one is to be born Japanese; the one on the right 
emphasizes the importance of patrilineality in imperial 
succession. Photo by the author.
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“Nevertheless, I do wish that the prime minister would also visit Yasukuni, even though 
I cannot clearly explain my reasons.” “But why?,” I insisted. He replied: “I cannot tell you 
exactly. The official commemoration is one thing; going to the shrine is something else. 
Perhaps it is because I would like him to visit the place where those who died for their 
country rest.” “Is that not some sort of a religious sensitivity?” I remarked. He admitted: “Yes, 
perhaps. Yes, certainly…” 47 This conversation suggests that a civil (that is, nonreligious) 
commemoration alone can never suffice to satisfy the sympathizers of Nippon Kaigi.
(ii) Nationalist Manifestations of a Japanese-type Civil Religion
Following Robert Bellah, I understand civil religion as a celebration of the national 
community; a collective devotion centered on the community that may be grounded 
in preexisting beliefs and religious practices, but that is not explicitly connected to one 
particular religion.48 Would it be possible, then, to consider civil religion as a type of 
secularization? In my opinion, it is not, for the unity of the nation still rests on notions of 
a religious nature: divine protection (“One nation under God”) in the case of the USA; 
the emperor and the enshrined spirits of the war dead in the case of Japan—at least in the 
case of the nationalist circles. I therefore consider civil religion to be a hybrid phenomenon, 
which is both political and religious.
Kamei Shizuka is a Japanese political veteran, who currently occupies the position of 
councilor in the parliamentary association of Nippon Kaigi, and whose ideas are situated 
somewhere in between State Shinto-inspired religious nationalism and the nationalist 
manifestations of civil religion. His declarations are first of all reminiscent of civil religion: 
“The emperor reminds us of our Japaneseness; more, even, than seeing Mount Fuji.” I 
suggested that this may be a sensitivity of a nonreligious nature. But he replied: “No. It 
is religious: the emperor is a Shinto priest (kannushi 神主).” 49 Other members of the Diet 
whom I have interviewed were not as explicit about the religious nature of the emperor. 
Their attitude is quite understandable in the context of the state secularism characterizing 
today’s Japan. Nevertheless, all the politicians whom I interviewed agreed on the 
indispensability of the imperial institution: without the emperor, Japan would cease to be 
Japan. This position is the prerequisite for joining the Diet organization of Nippon Kaigi. 
MP Sakurai Hiroshi told me that he openly said to members of Nippon Kaigi that he is a 
Christian, whereupon he was asked how he feels about the emperor. When he declared his 
profound respect for the imperial institution, he was told that this is sufficient for joining 
the organization.50
This profound respect for the imperial family, which here has a secular character, is 
apparent in the pages of Nippon Kaigi’s monthly magazine. As a matter of fact, the second 
page of this magazine is often devoted to an account of recent activities of the imperial 
family, written in extremely respectful language. Similarly, the publishing house associated 
with Nippon Kaigi, Meiseisha 明成社, has published a book for children, which deals with 
the topic of the origins of Japan. The author, the aforementioned Nitta Hitoshi, explains 
47 Interview conducted on 21 November 2014 at the city hall in Tsu.
48 Bellah 1967.
49 Interview conducted on 3 March 2015.
50 Interview conducted on 11 November 2014.
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that all countries in the world have their own typical features. Some countries have much 
political power, others are strong culturally, and others are good at sports. The unique 
characteristics of Japan, he argues, are grounded in the fact that the country has such a 
long history, and that the gods have been worshipped since ancient times. Most of all, those 
characteristics are based on the existence of the emperor.51 
This point of view may remind one of former Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō. On 26 
May 2000, he gave a press conference in order to justify, based on the logic of civil religion, 
his statements that Japan is the country of the gods, centered on the emperor.52 In the 
perception of Mori, the belief in deities (kami 神) and the faith in the reassuring presence 
of the emperor do not have explicitly religious connotations, as these are nothing but the 
concrete manifestations of the national tradition: “The expression ‘country of the gods’ did 
not refer to any religion in particular. I wanted to express a very ancient way of thinking in 
our country, which consists of seeing the presence of elements that transcend human beings 
in natural phenomena such as mountains, rivers, and the sea.” 53 Mark Mullins analyzed 
Mori’s statement similarly: “Mori’s concluding statement is representative of a widespread 
understanding of Shintō as something ‘non-religious’ (in the sectarian sense, that is), but still 
regarded as something that is essential for defining what it means to be Japanese.” 54 MP Mori 
Eisuke, member of the Liberal Democratic Party and vice-president of the parliamentary 
association of Nippon Kaigi, illustrates this point of view well. When we met, I presented 
him with a list of MPs affiliated with Nippon Kaigi, and asked whether the people represent 
a diversity of ideological positions. Mori replied as follows: “Yes, they do, but I do think 
there is a common spirit. There is a shared nostalgia and attachment to Shinto shrines. They 
are a bit like the ‘homeland of our hearts’ (kokoro no furusato 心の故郷).” 55
Presented by the nationalist circles as the only legitimate site for the commemoration 
of the war dead, Yasukuni Shrine is also often perceived from a civil religious perspective. 
Nippon Kaigi rejoiced in the fact that more than 200,000 people visited the shrine on 15 
August 2005, the sixtieth anniversary of Japan’s defeat.56 The same issue of Nippon Kaigi’s 
magazine contains an article written by former diplomat Okazaki Hisahiko, pleading for 
a resumption of imperial visits to Yasukuni, concluding as follows: “If the official visits 
of the prime minister to Yasukuni Shrine take root, they would pave the way to visits by 
his majesty the emperor. Such imperial visits would constitute a proof of the spiritual 
regeneration of our country as a sovereign state. I wish our statesmen would become deeply 
aware of this fact.” 57
By way of conclusion, I would like to quote the municipal councilor of the city 
of Tsu whom I already introduced in the previous section. It was he who—probably 
51 Nitta 2004, pp. 59–60.
52 The controversial statements had been made ten days earlier, in front of members of the parliamentary 
organization of Shintō Seiji Renmei.
53 Guthmann 2010; Guthmann 2014, p. 54.
54 Mullins 2012a, p. 79. On the topic of Shinto as a non-religion, see also the articles by Ernils Larsson and Aike 
Rots in this volume.
55 Interview conducted on 23 March 2015.
56 Nippon no ibuki, September 2005, p. 2. On this day in 2013, there were about 175,000 visitors (The Wall 
Street Journal viewed online at http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/08/15/huge-crowds-pour-into 
-yasukuni-shrine-on-war-anniversary/. Accessed 2 July 2016).
57 Nippon no ibuki, September 2005, p. 7.
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involuntarily—put his finger on the “civil religious” dimension of the popular devotion to 
the imperial family when he said: “I believe that a majority of the Japanese feel a natural 
love and respect (keiai suru 敬愛する) for the imperial family. I also think that, contrary 
to most other countries, there is no true religion in Japan; the imperial family plays that 
role.” 58
Conclusion
When it comes to individual Japanese, there is no denying the fact that the majority are 
increasingly cut off from religion, as a result of the process of secularization that started at 
the end of the war. However, as I have tried to show in this article, for nationalist circles in 
Japan—whose influence has grown since the end of the 1990s—the secularization of the 
political sphere has never been a feasible option. For them, as I wrote, State Shinto survived 
Japan’s wartime defeat, especially in the form of emperor worship and ceremonies for the 
war dead at Yasukuni Shrine. I proceeded by explaining that today’s nationalist circles, 
headed by Nippon Kaigi, draw primarily on the ideological sources of State Shinto. In the 
second part of the article, however, I pointed out that even among the supporters of Nippon 
Kaigi, the ideological links with State Shinto fall on a spectrum, ranging from a political-
religious nationalism close to the one that existed in the past to nationalist manifestations of 
a Japanese-type civil religion. 
In Japanese nationalist circles, we can observe a constant moving back and forth 
between a religiously grounded nationalism and the affirmation of the legitimacy of civil 
religion. The pendulum movement between these two positions is well illustrated by the 
responses of the president of Nippon Kaigi, Takubo Tadae 田久保忠衛, to the numerous 
criticisms and attacks recently levied at the group. In a recent article, President Takubo 
confirms that, throughout Japanese history, the emperor has only rarely had real political 
power, even though he has always been a source of authority. He then asks the following 
question: “Is it forbidden to respect the eternal unbroken line of the Imperial House?” This 
is a reference to the Imperial House as the historical unifying force of the Japanese nation, 
made from the perspective of civil religion. In the same article, Takubo writes about visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine: 
Some people say visits to Yasukuni Shrine are scandalous. However, this is a “shrine 
where the spirits are invited to come together” (shōkonsha 招魂社); therefore, there are 
no more Class A war criminals, and no Class B war criminals either.59 These visits 
express nothing but the will to respect the memory of those who died during the war, 
and who have said: “Let’s meet again at Yasukuni!” Criticism [towards Yasukuni] is 
based on a total lack of understanding of what Japanese Shinto is.60
To justify official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the president of Nippon Kaigi here relies 
on an understanding of life and death belonging to a particular religion, Shinto, while 
simultaneously stating that visitors are only motivated by a desire to commemorate those 
58 Interview conducted on 21 November 2014 at the city hall in Tsu.
59 Shōkonsha is the original name of Yasukuni Shrine.
60 Takubo 2016, pp. 36–37.
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who died for their country. This is an example of how 
a position that initially is based on a civil religious 
sensitivity can be caught up in a nationalist argument 
that is fundamentally religious.
It should be noted that, ultimately, contemporary 
Japanese nationalism often rests on nostalgia for 
a golden age. Raoul Girardet has described this 
sentiment and related political mythmaking, which 
is probably universal, as follows: “Opposed to the 
image of a present experienced and described as a time 
of sadness and decline, stands the absolute of a past 
characterized by plenitude and brightness.” 61 This is 
well exemplified by the front covers of the monthly 
magazine of Nippon Kaigi, Nippon no ibuki, which 
always feature a large drawing showing children or 
a family engaging in activities of the past such as 
using a hand pump to get water from a well, catching 
dragonflies, and laying out freshly harvested rice to dry 
in the sun. The message conveyed by these front page 
illustrations is unequivocal: in the old days, the Japanese were happier and more virtuous 
than today. The Japan presented here is one of bygone days, without TV, video games, or 
cars, when families were simply happy doing their daily activities together. The front cover 
of the September 2015 issue shows a mother with three children in a traditional house 
during a thunderstorm. We see the mother on the veranda, surrounded by her children; she 
has opened the wooden sliding door, and is closing the external shutters, also made of wood. 
Of course, the large majority of Japanese families today no longer live in such traditional 
houses, which are generally considered to be cold and impractical. The Japan desired in 
nationalist circles exists in a past that has taken on legendary proportions. “Images of a 
mythicized past; visions of a present and a future defined in terms of what was or what is 
believed to have been”—this is the state of mind of those who believe in the myth of the 
golden age.62
According to Nippon Kaigi as well as nationalist circles in general, it is crucial for the 
future of the country that the values of the past be restored. The past idealized by them 
is the prewar period, during which Japan was a powerful colonial empire (Dai Nippon 
Teikoku 大日本帝国). Devotion to the emperor on the one hand, and to the war dead at 
Yasukuni Shrine on the other, constitute the links that bind today’s Japan to this golden age 
of the Japanese nation. Now, as I have attempted to show, these two essential elements of 
State Shinto still contain important religious dimensions. Therefore, the secularization of 
the nationalist circles appears to be completely impossible.
 Translated by Aike P. Rots
61 Girardet 1986, p. 98.
62 Girardet 1986, p. 97.
Figure 4. Front cover of Nippon no ibuki, 
no. 334, September 2015. Illustration by 
Takenaka Toshihiro.
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